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Talking with one voice? 
Conversation networks and political polarization 
 
• Analyses the effects of political homogeneity and heterogeneity in citizens’ conversation 
networks on ideological position 
• Other things being equal, membership of more politically homogenous conversation networks 
leads individuals into more extreme political evaluations 
• Network homogeneity drives polarisation of political attitudes and creates larger perceived 
gulfs between individuals’’ own views and the views they ascribe to parties opposed by their 
conversation partners. 
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Talking with one voice? 
Conversation networks and political polarization 
 
Abstract 
Persuasion is a well-known consequence of political discussion between citizens: people 
bring their partisan and ideological views into line with those of their discussion partners. 
Less often considered is another aspect of this process: does persuasion in conversation 
networks increase the gap individuals perceive between their own views and those of groups 
or parties opposed by their discussion partners? Building on work which suggests that 
ideological homogeneity within networks leads to increased polarisation and drives 
individuals to relative political extremes, the paper examines British voters’ perceptions of  
parties whose views they do not share. The more internally homogeneous the partisan 
message coming from their main discussion partners, the more extreme individuals become 
in their views, and the greater the gulf they perceive between themselves and parties not 
supported by their networks. But the effect is evident only on issues which are politically 
salient, suggesting this is a real conversation effect. 
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Research over the last two decades has examined the effects of conversation between citizens 
on vote choice (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995; Pattie and Johnston, 1999, 2000), changing 
political attitudes over time (Pattie and Johnston, 2001), levels of tolerance and understanding 
of viewpoints different to one’s own (Mutz, 2002a, 2006; Pattie and Johnston 2008; Ben-Nun 
Bloom and Bagno-Moldavksy, 2014) and political participation (Mutz, 2002b, 2006; Mutz 
and Mondak, 2006; Nir, 2005, 2011; Pattie and Johnston 2009, 2013). Much of that work has 
shown that people – especially those who are not themselves strongly partisan – tend to come 
into agreement with the dominant political view among those they talk to regularly (e.g. 
Pattie and Johnston, 2002; McClurg, 2004). That said, few conversation networks are 
comprised of entirely like-minded individuals, and most contain some members who think 
differently from the majority on at least some issues. This ensures that, despite the tendency 
for conversation networks to converge on similar positions, disagreement and political 
diversity persist (Huckfeldt et al., 2004). 
 
Less attention has been paid, however, to the possibility that conversation networks might 
increase the perceived distance between individuals’ opinions and those of individuals or 
groups holding views opposed by most in one’s conversation network. Conversations might 
bond individuals within the network, both socially and ideologically. But do they also tend to 
isolate their members, at least ideologically, from individuals in other networks? And, 
potentially still worse, does homogeneity in conversation networks contribute to polarisation 
of views? Do individuals in politically homogeneous conversation networks see parties 
opposed by others in their networks as more extreme (both absolutely and relative to their 
own positions), and parties supported by their networks as more moderate than do voters in 
less homogeneous networks? As discussed below, American work suggests this might indeed 
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be the case, contributing to the widely-noted polarisation of politics there. But is this just a 
feature of the political landscape in the USA, or does it apply more widely? This is the 
question at the heart of the current paper, which investigates the effects of political 
heterogeneity and homogeneity within conversation networks on perceptions of ideological 
polarisation in the UK. 
 
Discussion, diversity and polarisation 
 
Political discussion between citizens is often seen as normatively desirable. Sharing and 
comparing views, advocating positions, persuading each other: these are generally taken as 
cornerstones of healthy democratic politics (e.g. Dahl, 1998). However, there is also a dark 
side. If convergence within peer groups leads to ‘group think’, political conversations 
between citizens could lead away from open deliberation and tolerance towards a balkanized 
political landscape, in which individuals increasingly occupy echo chambers where their own 
opinions and prejudices are validated by like-minded others and where opposing points of 
view are seldom given a hearing and are dismissed as beyond the pale of reasonable 
discussion. If this happens, those within the echo-chamber may come to see themselves and 
their opinions as reasonable and correct, while those holding alternative views are dismissed 
as wrong-headed, extreme zealots. In the United States, for instance, as the mainstream 
political parties have become ever more ideologically distinct from each other, and as 
political discourse has become more heated, a lively debate has emerged over whether 
American citizens are becoming more polarised socially, geographically and politically (e.g. 
Bishop and Cushing, 2009; Gimpel and Schuknecht, 2004; Gelman et al., 2008; Poole and 
Rosenthal, 1984; Ura and Ellis, 2012; Abramowitz and Saunders, 2008; Fiorina and Abrams, 
2008; Fiorina et al., 2008). 
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Social networks have the potential to affect such polarization. For instance, widespread and 
active interaction with other citizens helps build social capital (Putnam, 1993). But not all 
social capital is ‘good’. Putnam (2000, 24) distinguishes between bridging and bonding social 
capital. The former, he argues, develops when people encounter a diverse range of others in 
conditions of relative equality. By rubbing along with people who think differently, behave 
differently, and so on, we learn to trust each other and to tolerate and accommodate 
difference (see Christ et al., 2014). But, he further claims, when people socialise largely 
within closed communities of the like-minded, bonding social capital develops. This stresses 
the factors which unite members of the in-group but divide them from the out-group. Where 
bonding social capital dominates, therefore, those in the in-group increasingly come to trust 
and understand other in-group members, while seeing those outside the group as alien.  
 
Recent experimental research (summarised in Sunstein, 2009) demonstrates that the extent to 
which discussion networks are open or closed to a diverse range of competing views has 
consequences not only for what individuals themselves think, but also for how they think of 
others. Other things being equal, the more uniform the views expressed within networks, the 
greater the ideological distance network members perceive between their own views and the 
views of those whose opinions are not shared by others in the network. Individuals 
surrounded by discussants who are all Republicans tend to see Democrats’ views as more 
outré than do individuals in either mixed or Democrat-dominated networks, and vice-versa. 
As Sunstein notes, ‘(g)roups go to extremes’, especially when group members receive 
affirmation for their own views from the opinions of their fellows (2009, 3). Far from leading 
to broad consensus and convergence on the political middle ground, he finds, discussion 
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among the like-minded drives people apart ideologically: ‘We are right; everyone else is not 
only wrong, but they are even more wrong than we thought before we began to discuss it’. 
 
This is not a pleasing prospect for those (like advocates of deliberative democracy: Fishkin, 
1995; Elster, 1998) who hope deliberation will lead to the adoption of reasoned and 
consensual views. But does discussion among the like-minded really drive us apart 
ideologically, and (if it does) how far does it do so? Are we being driven into ideologically 
distinct ghettoes, miles apart on the major issues? Or are the shifts smaller-scale and more 
subtle? What is more, how general is this phenomenon? Is it a feature of the currently 
relatively polarised political environment in the USA, or will it also apply in countries like 
the UK, where there has been ideological convergence rather than polarisation between the 
major political parties over the last 20 years? In the remainder of the paper, therefore, we try 
to address these questions through a consideration of the effects of unanimity of voice in 
conversation networks among British voters. 
 
Measuring political diversity in conversation networks 
 
Assessing the effect of discussions within conversation networks on perceptions of how 
extreme each party is requires information on where respondents place themselves in 
ideological space, and where they place the parties. And it requires data on the political 
composition of individuals’ conversation networks. Few surveys provide both these 
requirements: we turn, therefore, to the 1987, 1992 and 2015 British Election Studies (BES), 
which do provide the necessary information. While most BES surveys since the early 1980s 
have asked questions which allow us to calculate how large a gap individuals perceive on a 
range of issues between their own views and where they think the major parties stand, only 
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the 1987, 1992 and 2014 surveys used here ask relevant questions regarding conversation 
networks. We are therefore limited to these three data sets.  
 
There is a virtue to looking at several data sets rather than just one. Repeating our analyses in 
different years, and hence for different data sets and under different external political 
conditions allows us to check how robust and replicable our findings are. The first two BES 
surveys used here were large, nationally representative post-election surveys, with much of 
the data gathered in face-to-face interviews, and some further information solicited via mail-
back self-completion questionnaires. The third, meanwhile, is a considerably larger internet 
panel: in the analyses below, we look at data from the second wave of the panel, which was 
conducted in May and June 2014, about a year before the 2015 UK General Election.
1
 This 
also provides a further dimension to our analyses, allowing us to compare conversation 
network effects during ‘first order’ general elections (1987 and 1992) with  those during 
‘second order’ elections (2014 was not a general election year in the UK, but there was an 
election for the European Parliament). 
 
In all three surveys, BES respondents were asked about the people with whom they were 
most likely to talk about ‘important issues’ or politics. In 1987, they were asked about the 
two people they discussed politics with most often during the election campaign. In 1992 
they were asked about the two people they discussed ‘important matters with most often’ and 
(if they could identify someone) about another person with whom they talked ‘regularly 
about politics’. And in 2014, they were asked to name up to three individuals with whom they 
‘sometimes talk(ed) about politics’. Despite the differences in the numbers of conversation 
partners elicited (a maximum of 2 in 1987, but up to 3 in 1992 and 2014), and the 
conversational contexts being tested (political conversations during the election campaign in 
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1987, ‘important matters’ and ‘politics’ at any time in 1992, politics ‘sometimes’ in 2014), all 
three years’ responses give insight into individuals’ conversational networks. Unsurprisingly, 
the most frequently named discussion partner was the respondent’s spouse or partner (47% 
named their partner in 1987, as did 48% in 1992, and 43% in 2014). Other family members 
and relatives were also frequently cited (29% of respondents named a family member in 
1987, 38% did in 1992, and 37% did in 2014). But comparable numbers also said they talked 
about politics with people (friends, neighbours, work colleagues and so on) outside their 
families (40% named such a person in 1987, as did 38% in 1992 and 49% in 2014). 
 
In all three years, too, respondents were asked a range of questions about their conversation 
partners. Of particular interest here, they were asked to say which, if any, party they thought 
each of their discussants supported. These responses were used to get some idea of 
conversation networks’ political compositions.  
 
To measure the extent to which these conversation networks spoke with one political voice, 
or many, or none at all, respondents were classified into five groups, depending on what they 
said about the partisan composition of their conversation networks: those who said there were 
no identifiable partisans in their networks (35% in 1987; 30% in 1992; 37% in 2014); those 
who said all the partisans in their network were Conservatives (18%, 17%  and 14% 
respectively); those who said all partisans were Labour voters (13%, 11% and 18%): those 
who said their networks contained only Liberal-SDP Alliance/Liberal Democrat partisans 
(5%, 2% and 3%);
2
 and those who said their networks contained partisans supporting several 
parties (29%, 40% and 28%).
3
  
 
Measuring ideological distance 
Page 8 of 39The British Journal of Politics and International Relations
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
8 
 
 
The BES surveys also allow us to evaluate how close or far individuals think they are 
ideologically from each of the main parties on a variety of issues, which gives us a rough 
indicator of political polarization. Respondents were asked to place themselves, and then each 
of the major parties, on a series of 11- or 7-point ideological scales, where one end of the 
scale represented one ideological extreme on an issue, and the other end the opposite 
extreme. Given this information, it is possible to measure not only where each individual sits 
in ideological space but (by comparing their own scores with those they give each party) how 
far they think they are from each party. In 1987, the questions were asked of all BES 
respondents. In 1992, only about half (chosen at random) were asked them; in 2014, 
meanwhile, one question was asked of around half the sample, and the other of almost all.  
 
The various political issues covered by these scales vary in salience:  some are salient in most 
elections, some are salient in some contests but not in others, and some are rarely if ever 
salient. The variation in issue salience is useful here, as it means different issues had different 
chances of coming up in political conversations, allowing us some (albeit limited) leverage 
over what, if anything, was important about political conversation. Did the specific subject 
matter of conversations matter (in which case we might expect to see larger effects for more 
salient than for less salient issues)? Or was it the general ideological tenor of conversation 
networks, and not the specific content of each discussion that mattered (in which case we 
might expect to see similar effects of conversation on all scales, whether salient or not)? 
Similarly, the comparison of first order (1987 and 1992) and second order (2014) election 
years enables us to say something about whether political conversations work differently in 
relatively high versus relatively low salience contests (as we might expect less frequent and 
less intense political discussions between voters in the latter than in the former). 
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The first ideological domain we investigate is the left-right dimension (Evans and Heath, 
1995; Evans et al., 1996). This (and, with it, attitudes on income redistribution) is the 
underlying ideological ground on which almost all modern British elections have been 
fought. It is, therefore, highly salient in all contests and likely to have been reflected in most 
political conversations throughout the period – hard to avoid, and hard not to take sides on. 
There has, it must be noted, been substantial policy convergence between the major parties in 
the UK since the 1980s, as all have moved closer to the ideological centre ground. Even so, 
the rhetoric of elections still makes copious use of the language of left and right. 
 
To tap this dimension, we look at several measures. Four sets of questions were asked in the 
BES surveys for both 1987 and 1992 (figure 1). The first asked about the relative pay-off 
between tackling unemployment and tackling inflation. The far left of the scale (coded 1) was 
the view that getting people back to work should be the government’s top priority; the far 
right (coded 11) was the view that the top priority should be tackling inflation. The second 
scale (also coded from 1 to 11) asked for personal and perceived party positions on a scale 
which contrasted increasing public spending, even if that required raising taxes, with cutting 
taxes, even if that necessitated cutting public spending. The third scale, meanwhile, reflected 
attitudes to nationalisation and privatisation of industry: the anchor on the left was the view 
that government should nationalise many more private companies, while the right-wing 
equivalent was the view that governments should sell off many more state-owned companies 
to the private sector. Finally, the fourth scale (a variant of which was also asked of all 
respondents in 2014) looked at attitudes on redistribution: at one extreme was the view that 
government should make greater efforts to make people’s incomes more equal, and at the 
other was the view that government should be much less concerned with income inequality.  
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As combining attitude scales helps minimise measurement errors inherent in using single-
item scales (Ansolabehere et al., 2008), respondents’ self-assessments of their own positions 
on each of these scales were averaged to produce a summary left-right scale for both 1987 
and 1992.
4
 Similar scales were calculated for their placement of the Conservatives, Labour 
and the Liberal-SDP Alliance/Liberal Democrats.
5
 Subtracting each respondent’s average 
placement of each party on this summary left-right scale from their average self-placement 
gives a measure of how large an ideological distance they perceived between themselves and 
the party. The closer to zero the resulting answer, the more similar they thought the party’s 
position to their own. The more negative the answer, the more right-wing they thought the 
party was compared to their own position. And the more positive the answer, the more left-
wing the party was perceived as being compared to themselves.  
 
As with the general left-right dimension, debates over welfare provision have also provided 
one of the most regular and salient fault lines of political debate at least since the late 1970s. 
In 1987, for instance, 75% of individuals surveyed by IPSOS-MORI in the month before the 
election said unemployment was one of the main issues facing the country, while 19% named 
the NHS and 17% education: five years later, these were still seen as important issues, 57% 
naming unemployment as a key issue in 1992, 32% the NHS and 23% education. We use a 
number of questions from different BES surveys to get at this. In 1987, respondents were 
asked their views on welfare, contrasting those who felt ‘the poor in Britain are entitled to 
more help from government’ (1) against those who felt ‘the poor in Britain should get less 
help from government and do more to help themselves’ (11). Although this fitted the left-
right dimension, it was not replicated in the 1992 study, so was omitted from the left-right 
scale, but we analyse it separately here. In 1992, half the respondents were asked another 
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welfare-related question, on a 1-7 point scale which  contrasted those who felt it was 
government’s responsibility to ensure that everyone had ‘a good job and a good standard of 
living’ (coded 1) with those who felt ‘government should just let each person get ahead on 
their own’ (coded 7). 
 
Other issues have fluctuated in importance over time. Defence is a good example. In 1987, 
the Cold War was still in full flow, and war with the nuclear-armed USSR and Warsaw Pact 
could not be ruled out. What is more, the major parties took radically different stances on the 
issue, with the Conservative government favouring the maintenance of a strong UK military 
and independent nuclear strike force, while its Labour opponents advocated unilateral nuclear 
disarmament.  Not surprisingly, therefore, defence proved a major battleground (sic) during 
that year’s election. By 1992, however, much of the heat had gone out of the issue. The 
Warsaw Pact and the USSR had imploded dramatically in 1989, bringing the external 
Communist threat and the Cold War to an abrupt and unexpected end. And in the meantime, 
as part of its march back to the political centre ground, Labour had abandoned its unilateralist 
position on nuclear weapons. Not surprisingly, given all this, the salience of defence issues 
changed substantially over time: the same IPSOS-MORI polls discussed above reveal that in 
April 1987, 21% thought nuclear weapons policy was a key issue facing the country: by 1992 
this had dwindled to just 1%. Questions on attitudes to defence were asked in both the 1987 
and 1992 surveys. In 1987, the relevant scale contrasted those who felt Britain should get rid 
of its nuclear weapons immediately (1) with those who felt the country should increase its 
nuclear arsenal ‘without delay’ (11). ). In 1992, half the BES respondents were asked a 7-
point question on defence, contrasting with those who felt much less should be spent on 
defence (coded 1) with those who felt defence spending should be much higher (coded 7). 
 
Page 12 of 39The British Journal of Politics and International Relations
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
12 
 
Some issues occupied something of a middle ground. Law and order was not a major 
campaign issue in 1987, but 19% of the public, according to IPSOS-MORI, thought it an 
important national issue.  A 1987 BES scale tapped law and order attitudes, contrasting those 
who felt protecting civil rights was a higher priority than cutting crime (1) against those who 
felt cutting crime trumped civil rights (11). 
 
Britain’s relations with the EU, meanwhile, hardly featured in the public mind in 1987 (only 
1% of IPSOS-MORI respondents identified it as a key issue) but it had grown substantially in 
importance by 1992 (when 14% named it as a key issue), no doubt reflecting the growing 
disputes within the Conservative government over the issue (which contributed to Mrs 
Thatcher’s removal as party leader and Prime Minister in 1990). Intriguingly (and again no 
doubt reflecting the Conservatives’ travails on the issue in the late 1980s and early 1990s), 
this public concern over the EU in 1992 was not reflected in the campaign itself: Europe did 
not surface as a major issue. That said, while not a negligible issue in 1992, the EU had not 
reached the pitch of public concern it was to receive over the next 20 years. By 2014, it had 
moved centre-stage in British politics, fuelled by an increasingly Eurosceptic mood among 
UK voters, and by the rapid rise of a new, explicitly anti-EU party, UKIP (Ford and 
Goodwin, 2014). In addition, whereas 1992 was a general election year (with the policy focus 
very much on the UK parliament) 2014 was a European Parliament election year, further 
heightening the salience of the EU in that year as opposed to the earlier one.  
 
In 1992, half of all respondents were asked about the European Union: those who felt ‘Britain 
should do all it can to unite fully with the European Community’ were coded 1, while those 
who felt the country ‘should do all it can to protect its independence from’ the Community 
were coded 11.  
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Attitudes to the EU were also tackled in the 2014 survey: respondents were asked ‘Some say 
European unification should be pushed further. Others say it has already gone too far. What is 
your opinion? And where would you place the following parties…’ This time, the scale runs 
from the most Eurosceptic responses (‘unification has already gone too far’, coded 0) to the 
most Europhilic (‘Unification should be pushed further’, coded 10). 
 
Our last issue, meanwhile, women’s rights, has not been a major campaign issue in recent UK 
elections. It did not play a major part in the 1992 election, for instance, despite Labour’s 
manifesto commitments to equal rights protection and a separate Ministry for Women. 
Women’s rights did not crop up at all as one of IPSOS-MORI’s salient issues that year.
6
  In 
that year’s BES, half of the respondents were asked where they, and the parties, stood on 
women’s rights: at one end of the scale were those who felt ‘women should have an equal 
role with men in running business, industry and government’ (coded 1); at the other end were 
those who felt ‘a woman’s place is in the home’ (coded 7). 
 
For all of these scales, the ideological gaps were calculated between respondents’ self-
placements and where they placed each of the main parties. This gives nine sets of 
differential measures, therefore: left-right differentials for 1987; a similar set for 1992; 
differentials in attitudes to welfare in 1987; differentials in attitudes in defence in 1987; 1987 
differentials in ideological placements on law and order; differentials in perceived positions 
on Europe in 1992 and 2014; differentials on attitudes to women’s rights in 1992; and finally 
differentials on attitudes to redistribution in 2014.  
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As discussed above, individuals who place themselves and a party on the same ideological 
position on an issue will score 0 on the relevant party differential scale. For all bar one of the 
scales, if they think the party is to the left of them, their score on the party differential 
measure will be positive; and if they think the party is to the right of them, their score will be 
negative. The larger the score, positive or negative, the more extreme they think the party is 
relative to their own position. In one case, attitudes to the EU in 2014, however, the scale 
runs in the opposite direction – negative if they think the party is to their left and positive if 
they think it is to their right. Summary information on all the scales is contained in Appendix 
1 (Table A1). 
 
Conversation networks and ideological distance from parties 
 
These difference measures are used to get a sense of whether the political make-up of 
individuals’ conversation networks affects their perceptions of how ideologically extreme 
each party is, relative to their own views. If politically homogeneous conversation networks 
have a polarising effect on individuals’ views of the parties, then (other things being equal) 
those whose conversation networks are comprised entirely of partisans of one party should 
perceive a larger gap between their own views and where they think the party’s main rival 
stands than should those whose networks are politically more diverse. The opposite should 
hold too: other things being equal, the more politically homogeneous an individual’s network, 
the smaller the gap he or she should perceive between him- or herself and the party supported 
by other network members.  
 
Individuals’ scores on most of the party differential measures inevitably reflect a variety of 
other factors besides the political composition of their social networks.  For instance, 
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individuals’ own partisan inclinations might have an effect: other things being equal, 
Conservative supporters should see themselves as ideologically closer to where they would 
position that party on an issue than would Labour or Liberal Democrat supporters, and so on 
for the other partisans and other parties, mutatis mutandis. Similarly, strength of partisanship 
might be germane: the stronger individuals’ partisan attachment to a particular party, the 
more certain they should be of their own views and of their evaluations of where the parties 
stand on the issues, and the less they should be influenced by the collective political leanings 
of those they talk to. For much the same reasons, how interested individuals are in politics 
might affect the extent to which their acquaintances’ views might influence their perceptions 
of the gap between their own ideological positions and those of the parties: other things being 
equal, those displaying a greater interest in politics might be expected to be less swayed by 
their peers than those who are less interested. Education, too, might play a similar role, such 
that those with more formal education might be less amenable to the influence of their peers 
than those with less. In a like manner, age might be a factor. The older individuals are, the 
more experience they have of politics and political parties on which to draw, and the more 
settled their own opinions are likely to be. Hence we might expect, other things being equal, 
older respondents to be less influenced by their peers than younger ones  
 
In our analyses of the party differential scores, we therefore control for: respondents’ partisan 
identifications; their strength of partisanship; in 1987 and 1992 their interest in politics and in 
2014 the amount of attention they generally paid to politics; the highest educational 
qualification claimed by each respondent; and their age. In addition, we take into account 
individuals’ social class. Details of the codings used are reported in Appendix 2. 
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Our primary interest here is the independent effect of social networks upon the ideological 
distance individuals perceived between themselves and each party. To assess this, the partisan 
composition of respondents’ conversation networks was added to the control variables in 
each model. The measure differentiates between individuals whose networks contained only 
supporters of the same party, were mixed (containing supporters of two or more different 
parties), or were non-partisan (contained no individuals with identifiable partisanship: this is 
the comparison group). As all models already control for respondents’ own partisanship, we 
take into account the tendency for people to see themselves as ideologically closer to parties 
they support than to parties they oppose. The key results for the network variables are 
reported in Tables 1, 2 and 3 (for 1987, 1992 and 2014 respectively: we also ran models 
replacing this measure of network diversity with measures of the numbers discussants 
supporting each of the main parties: these results, reported in Appendix 1 – see tables A2, A3 
and A4 – largely confirm the results discussed here, suggesting they are not just artefacts of 
how we measure our key independent variable). 
 
In 1987, a fairly consistent pattern emerges (Table 1: in this and subsequent tables only the 
network coefficients are reported, though all models also control for respondents’ own 
partisanship, class, education, age and interest in politics). Where an issue was electorally 
salient (the left-right scale, defence and welfare, in Tables 1a, 1b and 1c respectively), 
individuals in exclusively Conservative discussion networks were more likely to place 
themselves some distance to the right of the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal-SDP 
Alliance than were individuals whose conversation networks were entirely non-partisan. 
Similarly, individuals in exclusively Labour-supporting or exclusively Liberal-SDP Alliance 
supporting networks on average placed themselves further to the left of the Conservatives 
than did those in non-partisan networks. This is in line with the argument that political 
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consistency in conversation networks encourages ideological divergence away from parties 
not supported by network members. Those in politically mixed networks, meanwhile, on 
average placed themselves further left of the Conservatives and further right than Labour or 
the Alliance parties than did those on non-partisan networks.  
 
The main example of a non-salient issue in 1987 is law and order (reported in Table 1d), and 
here the pattern breaks down. Only one of the effects for consistency of conversation network 
reaches conventional levels of statistical significance. Consistent with expectations, 
respondents in all-Conservative networks tended to place themselves further to the right of 
Labour than did those in non-partisan networks. In no other case was there a clearly 
discernible effect. That said, the law and order models were poor fits (with very low R
2
 
values). 
 
By and large, the results for the 1992 models offer some corroboration (Table 2). The two 
most salient issue dimensions in 1992 were the left-right and the welfare dimensions (in 
Tables 2a and 2c respectively), and there the more Conservative an individual’s discussion 
network, other things being equal, the further to the right, on average, they tended to place 
themselves compared to Labour and the Liberal Democrats. The more Labour supporters they 
talked to, the further to the left of the Conservatives they felt. And individuals who reported 
that all their discussion partners were Liberal Democrats on average placed themselves 
further to the right of Labour and (marginally) the Liberal Democrats than did individuals in 
entirely non-partisan discussion networks. 
 
As in 1987, however, the partisan make-up of conversation networks has less clear effects 
when we turn to issues which were less salient in 1992. The more Labour-supporting an 
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individual’s network, other things being equal, the further to the left of the Conservatives 
they felt themselves to be on Europe (Table 2b) and on defence (Table 2e). And the more 
Conservative supporters individuals reported talking to, the further to the right of Labour they 
reported themselves to be on defence. But few other network coefficients proved significant 
(and those that did prove significant for one operationalization of network partisanship were 
often not significant for the other, suggesting these were not consistent results). 
 
A similar story holds in 2014 (Table 3). The more exclusively Conservative an individual’s 
conversation network, the further to the right they were, relatively, of all three parties on both 
European integration (Table 3a) and income redistribution (Table 3b). And the stronger the 
representation of Labour or Liberal Democrat voices among those they talked to, other things 
being equal, the further to the left, relatively, of the parties they were, other things being 
equal. This does not trump partisanship: for instance, analysis of the full models (not reported 
here) shows that Conservative supporters remain to the right of Labour supporters, and of 
where they themselves place the main parties, in absolute terms. But in relative terms, 
Conservatives whose discussion networks were mainly with other Conservatives placed 
themselves further to the right of the parties than did Conservatives whose discussion 
networks were mainly with Labour or Liberal Democrat supporters. 
 
Comparing the 2014 results with those for 1987 and 1992 also suggest that the influence of 
political homogeneity in conversation networks on ideological polarisation does not depend 
particularly on whether conversations take place in the context of a first order rather than a 
second order election. The effects are similar, and of comparable dimensions, in all three 
years. Political conversations between citizens are, it seems, part of the background of civic 
life: they have effects in both more and less politically salient contexts. 
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There is evidence, therefore, to suggest that individuals in more politically homogeneous 
conversation networks tend to perceive greater ideological polarisation on electorally salient 
issues between their own views and where they think the parties stand than do those in less 
consistently partisan networks. But how large are these effects? Most of the derived 
difference scales have a 21-point potential range, from -10 to +10, while three of the 1992 
scales (for welfare, defence and women’s rights) have a 13-point range, from -6 to +6. 
Bearing that in mind, the significant coefficients for the models focussing on partisan 
unanimity in conversation networks suggest only modest effects. For instance, those whose 
discussion networks contained only people who were themselves Conservative supporters 
perceived a slightly wider gap between their own and Labour’s position on the left-right scale 
than did those in non-partisan networks, 0.81 points further right of Labour in 1987 and 1.11 
points further right in 1992. Other significant effects are of the same order of magnitude or 
smaller. 
 
While greater partisan unanimity within conversation networks can lead to increasingly 
polarised views of the parties’ positions on the major issues of the day relative to the 
individual’s, therefore, the effects are modest in size. That said, this should not of itself be 
terribly surprising. Individuals’ own ideological positions, and their evaluations of where the 
parties stand, are shaped by many influences, including long-term socialisation, evaluations 
of party performance, education, and so on. Such deep-seated influences are unlikely to be 
overturned simply by the effects of conversations, therefore. Given that, even relatively 
modest effects are still important. Like the proverbial dog walking on two legs, it isn’t so 
much that it is well done (or, in our case, has a large effect) that impresses: it is that it is done 
(has an effect) at all. 
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Conclusions 
 
Other things being equal, partisan consistency in British conversation networks drives a 
degree of ideological divergence. The more that the members of an individual’s conversation 
networks speak with one political voice, preferring one party more than the others, the more 
that person’s opinions on major issues tend to move away from where they place the other 
parties – and in the ideological direction of the party supported by their conversation 
networks. Those embedded in predominantly Conservative-supporting networks think of 
themselves as further to the right of Labour and the Liberals than do most other individuals. 
Those whose discussion partners mainly support Labour tend to see themselves as being 
further to the left, on average, of the Conservative and the Liberals than do others. And those 
in Liberal-supporting networks tend to think of themselves as further to the left of the 
Conservatives and further to the right of Labour than do other voters. 
 
The effect holds both in ‘first order election’ years, when conversations about politics are 
likely to be frequent, intense and pervasive, and in ‘second order election’ years, when the 
intensity of political conversation is liable to be lower. However, this effect is clearest for 
issues which were salient in the particular election studied. It is weaker for less salient issues, 
and weakest of all for issues which barely featured during the election. In other words, the 
effect is most pronounced on those issues which were most likely to be part of the national 
conversation at that contest. While this does not prove that it is not only the general partisan 
leanings but also the specific issue content of conversations which matter politically, it is 
certainly strong circumstantial evidence that this is the case.  
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But although increasing ideological unanimity in one’s conversation network does create 
pressures towards polarisation of political perceptions, the effects are, on the whole, 
relatively modest. Those in all-Conservative supporting networks are a little more likely to 
think Labour and the Liberal Democrats are further left of themselves than are individuals in 
mixed or non-partisan networks, just as those in all-Labour networks are liable to see the 
Conservatives as further from them to the right than are those in more mixed networks. But 
not overwhelmingly so. Conversation may polarise a bit. But it does not seem (for most 
people) to push them into ideological ghettoes. Not only that, but most conversation networks 
are either non-partisan or are to some degree mixed, exposing most people to alternative 
views to their own, and to the views of most of those we talk to. At least in the British 
context, therefore, the threat of citizens retreating into self-confirming communities of the 
like-minded which perceive larger and larger ideological distances between their own and 
rival political views is, while real, not overwhelming.  Being embedded in friendship circles 
with different partisan compositions may drive Britons apart a little, but not so far as to make 
the gap unbridgeable. The implications for democracy, while not golden, are not disastrous 
either.  And there is a silver lining too: to the extent that most conversation networks remain 
politically diverse, citizens are more likely to see at least some common ground with their 
political rivals. Talk matters. 
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Notes
 
1 All three surveys are weighted in the analyses below, to take account of sample biases and 
substantial over-samples of Scottish respondents. 
2 In 1987, the centre ground of British politics was dominated by a formal alliance between 
the Liberal Party and the Social Democrats. Prior to the 1992 election, the two merged to 
form one party, the Liberal Democrats (Stevenson, 1993). 
3 To check whether our results were dependent on how we defined key variables, we also 
used a different measure of network political diversity, the numbers of Conservative 
discussants, Labour discussants and Liberal-SDP Alliance/Liberal Democrat discussants in 
each individual’s network. The findings (not discussed in the main text) are consistent 
with those reported below for our main measure of network diversity, giving us 
considerable confidence in our results (details of the key results are available in Appendix 
1, Tables A2, A3 and A4). 
4 Cronbach’s Alpha for the four items was 0.640 in 1987, and 0.622 in 1992: as only one of 
the questions was asked in 2014, this was not an option then. While not a hard-and-fast 
rule, the conventional threshold for Cronbach’s alpha is 0.7 or above. That said, the exact 
value of alpha is partly a function of the number of items going into a scale, however; the 
more items in the scale, other things being equal, the higher the alpha will be. Here, with 
just four items in each scale, alpha will tend to be lower than for similar scales with more 
items. In most cases, even so, alpha gets close to the conventional 0.7 threshold and none 
drop far below 0.6. To maintain comparability between scales, it is important that the 
scales are all defined in the same way. Hence we accept scales with alphas slightly below 
the 0.7 threshold. 
Page 23 of 39 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
23 
 
 
5 The Cronbach’s Alpha scores for the Conservatives in 1987 and 1992 were 0.652 and 0.703 
respectively; for Labour, they were 0.572 and 0.552; and for the Liberal-SDP 
Alliance/Liberal Democrats, they were 0.572 and0 .604.  
6 It is worth noting that the survey company asked people to name, unprompted, the issues 
that mattered to them: it did not present them with a list to choose from. The absence of 
women’s rights as a pressing issue reflects public priorities, therefore, and not 
methodological artefacts. 
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Figure 1: The left-right scales 
 
a) Unemployment and inflation 
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people back 
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should be 
government’s 
top priority 
         Keeping 
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b) Taxation and government services 
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should put 
up taxes a 
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c) Nationalisation and privatisation 
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industries 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 
d) Redistribution 
 
Government 
should 
make much 
greater 
efforts to 
make 
people’s 
incomes 
more equal 
         Government 
should be 
much less 
concerned 
about how 
equal 
people’s 
incomes are 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
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Table 1: Uniformity of partisan discussants and the difference between personal and 
perceived party placement on the 1987 dimensions: regression models (standard errors in 
brackets: all models control for age, education, class, partisan ID, strength of party ID and 
interest in the election result) 
 
a) Difference between respondent L-R self-placement and: 
 Conservatives Labour Lib-SDP Alliance 
Partisan composition of conversation network  (comparison = non-partisan) 
All Conservatives 0.358 (0.132)** 0.807 (0.125)** 0.621 (0.120)** 
All Labour -0.877 (0.147)** 0.115 (0.137) -0.052 (0.130) 
All Lib-SDP -0.650 (0.215)** 0.127 (0.202) 0.344 (0.182)+ 
Mixed -0.480 (0.113)** 0.537 (0.107)** 0.317 (0.100)** 
R
2
 0.352 0.298 0.309 
    
b) Difference between respondent defence self-placement and: 
 Conservatives Labour Lib-SDP Alliance 
Partisan composition of conversation network (comparison = non-partisan) 
All Conservatives 0.342 (0.164)* 0.637 (0.169)** 0.463 (0.175)** 
All Labour -1.005 (0.182)** -0.234 (0.186) -0.664 (0.191)** 
All Lib-SDP -0.282 (0.269) -0.096 (0.276) -0.270 (0.275) 
Mixed -0.293 (0.141)* 0.226 (0.145) -0.181 (0.148) 
R
2
 0.250 0.127 0.178 
    
c) Difference between respondent welfare self-placement and: 
 Conservatives Labour Lib-SDP Alliance 
Partisan composition of conversation network (comparison = non-partisan) 
All Conservatives 0.373 (0.184)* 0.473 (0.165)** 0.340 (0.160)* 
All Labour -1.017 (0.204)** 0.123 (0.181) -0.137 (0.176) 
All Lib-SDP -0.755 (0.302)* 0.359 (0.268) 0.245 (0.249) 
Mixed -0.548 (0.158)** 0.200 (0.140) -0.045 (0.135) 
R
2
 0.300 0.176 0.191 
    
d) Difference between respondent law & order self-placement and: 
 Conservatives Labour Lib-SDP Alliance 
Partisan composition of conversation network (comparison = non-partisan) 
All Conservatives -0.165 (0.200) 0.466 (0.194)* 0.255 (0.172) 
All Labour -0.177 (0.222) 0.174 (0.213) -0.029 (0.189) 
All Lib-SDP -0.629 (0.332)+ 0.211 (0.318) -0.299 (0.271) 
Mixed -0.498 (0.172)** 0.280 (0.166) -0.038 (0.146) 
R
2
 0.052 0.066 0.044 
+ significant at p = 0.10 * significant at p = 0.05 ** significant at p = 0.01 
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Table 2: Uniformity of partisan discussants and the difference between personal and 
perceived party placement on the 1992 dimensions: regression models (standard errors in 
brackets: models control for age, education, class, partisan ID, strength of party ID and 
interest in the election result) 
 
a) Difference between respondent L-R self-placement and: 
 Conservatives Labour Liberal Democrats 
Partisan composition of conversation network (comparison = non-partisan) 
All Conservatives 0.553 (0.330)+ 1.108 (0.319)** 0.927 (0.286)** 
All Labour -1.398 (0.562)** -0.099 (0.385) -0.313 (0.345) 
All Lib Dems -0.179 (0.359) 0.498 (0.344) -0.041 (0.293) 
Mixed -0.038 (0.042) 0.126 (0.041)** 0.084 (0.036)* 
R
2
 0.299 0.220 0.253 
    
b) Difference between respondent EU self-placement and: 
 Conservatives Labour Liberal Democrats 
Partisan composition of conversation network (comparison = non-partisan) 
All Conservatives -0.101 (0.558) 0.641 (0.578) 0.888 (0.541) 
All Labour -1.410 (0.690)* -0.157 (0.696) -0.169 (0.642) 
All Lib Dems -0.425 (0.618) -0.183 (0.618) 0.151 (0.556) 
Mixed -0.123 (0.071)+ -0.096 (0.073) 0.008 (0.068) 
R
2
 0.065 0.039 0.038 
    
c) Difference between respondent welfare self-placement and: 
 Conservatives Labour Liberal Democrats 
Partisan composition of conversation network (comparison = non-partisan) 
All Conservatives 0.433 (0.271) 0.715 (0.270)** 0.564 (0.240)* 
All Labour -0.716 (0.333)* 0.383 (0.327) -0.029 (0.291) 
All Lib Dems -0.134 (0.235) -0.087 (0.245) 0.004 (0.198) 
Mixed -0.014 (0.035) 0.056 (0.034) 0.029 (0.031) 
R
2
 0.266 0.063 0.098 
    
d) Difference between respondent women’s rights self-placement and: 
 Conservatives Labour Liberal Democrats 
Partisan composition of conversation network (number of discussants who support party x) 
All Conservatives -0.039 (0.249) -0.025 (0.248) 0.025 (0.245) 
All Labour 0.098 (0.304) 0.329 (0.296) 0.285 (0.288) 
All Lib Dems 0.227 (0.241) 0.167 (0.232) 0.145 (0.205) 
Mixed 0.002 (0.032) -0.012 (0.031) 0.004 (0.030) 
R
2
 0.115 0.039 0.044 
    
e) Difference between respondent defence self-placement and: 
 Conservatives Labour Liberal Democrats 
Partisan composition of conversation network (comparison = non-partisan) 
All Conservatives 0.103 (0.272) 0.546 (0.270)* 0.205 (0.244) 
All Labour -0.628 (0.336)+ -0.053 (0.326) -0.225 (0.297) 
All Lib Dems -0.320 (0.247) 0.153 (0.241) 0.045 (0.207) 
Mixed -0.021 (0.035) 0.062 (0.034) 0.020 (0.031) 
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R
2
 0.074 0.087 0.090 
+ significant at p = 0.10 * significant at p = 0.05 ** significant at p = 0.01 
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Table 3: Uniformity of partisan discussants and the difference between personal and 
perceived party placement on the 2014 ideological dimensions: regression models (standard 
errors in brackets: models control for age, education, class, partisan ID, strength of party ID 
and attention to politics) 
 
a) Difference between respondent EU integration self-placement and: 
 Conservatives Labour Liberal Democrats 
Partisan composition of conversation network (comparison = non-partisan) 
All Conservatives -0.264 (0.126)* -0.346 (0.127)** -0.545 (0.142)** 
All Labour 0.141 (0.121) 0.436 (0.121)** 0.303 (0.135)* 
All Lib Dems 0.154 (0.072)* 0.187 (0.072)* 0.132 (0.079)+ 
Mixed -0.021 (0.025) -0.011 (0.025) -0.079 (0.028)** 
R
2
 0.123 0.147 0.135 
    
b) Difference between respondent redistribution self-placement and: 
 Conservatives Labour Liberal Democrats 
Partisan composition of conversation network (comparison = non-partisan) 
All Conservatives -0.073 (0.096) 0.576 (0.086)** 0.509 (0.093)** 
All Labour -0.666 (0.090)** -0.243 (0.080)** -0.505 (0.087)** 
All Lib Dems -0.231 (0.054)** -0.112 (0.048)* -0.188 (0.051)** 
Mixed -0.100 (0.019) 0.008 (0.017) -0.006 (0.018) 
R
2
 0.122 0.164 0.173 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: unreported analyses 
Table A1: Respondents’ ideological differentials between self-reported position and perceived party position. 
 
 Minimum Lower 
quartile 
Median Upper 
quartile 
Maximum Mean N 
1987 left-right scale: Conservative differential -10.00 -5.00 -2.50 -0.50 9.25 -2.97 3392 
1987 left-right scale: Labour differential -8.50 0.00 1.75 3.75 10.00 2.02 3341 
1987 left-right scale: Alliance differential -10.00 -1.25 0.00 1.50 10.00 0.14 2898 
        
1987 defence scale: Conservative differential -10.00 -5.00 -2.00 0.00 10.00 -2.88 3624 
1987 defence scale: Labour differential -10.00 1.00 3.00 5.00 10.00 3.06 3634 
1987 defence scale: Alliance differential -10.00 -2.00 0.00 2.00 10.00 0.24 3148 
        
1987 law + order scale: Conservative differential -10.00 -1.00 0.00 2.00 10.00 0.19 3517 
1987 law + order scale: Labour differential -10.00 0.00 1.00 4.00 10.00 2.07 3438 
1987 law + order scale: Alliance differential -10.00 0.00 1.00 3.00 10.00 1.35 3144 
        
1987 welfare scale: Conservative differential -10.00 -7.00 -3.00 0.00 10.00 -3.41 3655 
1987 welfare scale: Labour differential -10.00 0.00 1.00 4.00 10.00 1.83 3622 
1987 welfare scale: Alliance differential -10.00 -1.00 0.00 2.00 10.00 0.16 3298 
        
1992 left-right scale: Conservative differential -10.00 -5.00 -2.50 -0.50 5.00 -2.90 1278 
1992 left-right scale: Labour differential -9.50 0.00 1.00 3.13 10.00 1.48 1268 
1992 left-right scale: Lib Dem differential -10.00 -1.25 0.00 1.25 8.75 0.03 1132 
        
1992 Europe scale: Conservative differential -10.00 -2.00 0.00 2.00 10.00 0.40 1316 
1992 Europe scale: Labour differential -10.00 -2.00 0.00 3.00 10.00 0.74 1252 
1992 Europe scale: Lib Dem differential -10.00 -2.00 0.00 3.00 10.00 1.02 1187 
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1992 welfare scale: Conservative differential -6.00 -4.00 -1.00 0.00 6.00 -1.91 1359 
1992 welfare scale: Labour differential -6.00 -1.00 0.00 2.00 6.00 0.38 1352 
1992 welfare scale: Lib Dem differential -6.00 -1.00 0.00 1.00 6.00 -0.25 1263 
        
1992 defence scale: Conservative differential -6.00 -2.00 0.00 1.00 6.00 -0.58 1313 
1992 defence scale: Labour differential -6.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 6.00 0.76 1302 
1992 defence scale: Lib Dem differential -6.00 -1.00 0.00 1.00 6.00 0.21 1179 
        
1992 women’s rights scale: Conservative differential -6.00 -2.00 0.00 0.00 6.00 -0.79 1346 
1992 women’s rights scale: Labour differential -6.00 -2.00 0.00 0.00 6.00 -0.55 1318 
1992 women’s rights scale: Lib Dem differential -6.00 -2.00 -1.00 0.00 6.00 -0.64 1234 
        
2014 EU integration scale: Conservative differential -10.00 -4.00 -1.00 1.00 10.00 -1.12 10422 
2014 EU integration scale: Labour differential -10.00 -5.00 -2.00 0.00 10.00 -2.24 10151 
2014 EU integration scale: Lib Dem differential -10.00 -7.00 -3.00 0.00 10.00 -3.29 10165 
        
2014 redistribution scale: Conservative differential -10.00 -5.00 -1.00 0.00 10.00 1.08 21212 
2014 redistribution scale: Conservative differential -10.00 -1.00 0.00 3.00 10.00 -1.77 21198 
2014 redistribution scale: Conservative differential -10.00 -2.00 0.00 3.00 10.00 0.33 20207 
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Table A2:: Number of partisan discussants and difference between personal and perceived 
party placement on the 1987 defence ideological dimensions: regression models (standard 
errors in brackets: all models control for age, education, class, partisan ID, strength of party 
ID and interest in the election result) 
 
a) Difference between respondent L-R self-placement and: 
 Conservatives Labour Lib-SDP Alliance 
Partisan composition of conversation network (number of discussants who support party x) 
N Conservatives 0.233 (0.066)** 0.576 (0.062)** 0.411 (0.059)** 
N Labour -0.550 (0.071)** 0.070 (0.066) -0.034 (0.062) 
N Lib-SDP -0.410 (0.093)** 0.181 (0.087)* 0.151 (0.080)+ 
R
2
 0.353 0.307 0.314 
    
b) Difference between respondent defence self-placement and: 
 Conservatives Labour Lib-SDP Alliance 
Partisan composition of conversation network (number of discussants who support party x) 
N Conservatives 0.269 (0.083)** 0.439 (0.085)** 0.294 (0.087)** 
N Labour -0.509 (0.089)** -0.122 (0.090) -0.400 (0.093)** 
N Lib-SDP -0.182 (0.118) 0.010 (0.120) -0.194 (0.121) 
R
2
 0.248 0.131 0.181 
    
c) Difference between respondent welfare self-placement and: 
 Conservatives Labour Lib-SDP Alliance 
Partisan composition of conversation network (number of discussants who support party x) 
N Conservatives 0.322 (0.093)** 0.292 (0.082)** 0.202 (0.080)* 
N Labour -0.588 (0.099)** 0.009 (0.087) -0.109 (0.085) 
N Lib-SDP -0.441 (0.131)** 0.127 (0.116) -0.010 (0.109) 
R
2
 0.303 0.178 0.191 
    
d) Difference between respondent law & order self-placement and: 
 Conservatives Labour Lib-SDP Alliance 
Partisan composition of conversation network (number of discussants who support party x) 
N Conservatives -0.089 (0.101) 0.262 (0.098)** 0.115 (0.086) 
N Labour -0.207 (0.108)+ 0.025 (0.103) -0.051 (0.091) 
N Lib-SDP -0.397 (0.144)** 0.203 (0.138) -0.128 (0.118) 
R
2
 0.052 0.067 0.045 
 
+ significant at p = 0.10 * significant at p = 0.05 ** significant at p = 0.01 
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Table  A3: Number of partisan discussants and difference between personal and perceived 
party placement on the 1992 defence ideological dimensions: regression models (standard 
errors in brackets: all models control for age, education, class, partisan ID, strength of party 
ID and interest in the election result) 
 
a) Difference between respondent L-R self-placement and: 
 Conservatives Labour Liberal Democrats 
Partisan composition of conversation network (number of discussants who support party x) 
N Conservatives 0.127 (0.088) 0.355 (0.085)** 0.256 (0.076)** 
N Labour -0.439 (0.096)** -0.013 (0.092) -0.096 (0.083) 
N Lib Dems -0.131 (0.162) 0.107 (0.156) 0.024 (0.135) 
R
2
 0.304 0.220 0.252 
    
b) Difference between respondent EU self-placement and: 
 Conservatives Labour Liberal Democrats 
Partisan composition of conversation network (number of discussants who support party x) 
N Conservatives -0.215 (0.149) 0.001 (0.154) 0.082 (0.143) 
N Labour -0.577 (0.165)** -0.147 (0.169) -0.065 (0.155) 
N Lib Dems -0.660 (0.273)* -0.087 (0.283) 0.228 (0.255) 
R
2
 0.075 0.036 0.037 
    
c) Difference between respondent welfare self-placement and: 
 Conservatives Labour Liberal Democrats 
Partisan composition of conversation network (number of discussants who support party x) 
N Conservatives 0.282 (0.072)** 0.224 (0.072)** 0.207 (0.064)** 
N Labour -0.289 (0.081)** 0.049 (0.080) 0.005 (0.071) 
N Lib Dems -0.126 (0.123) -0.001 (0.124) 0.076 (0.106) 
R
2
 0.280 0.065 0.102 
    
d) Difference between respondent women’s rights self-placement and: 
 Conservatives Labour Liberal Democrats 
Partisan composition of conversation network (number of discussants who support party x) 
N Conservatives 0.055 (0.067) -0.019 (0.066) 0.018 (0.065) 
N Labour -0.106 (0.075) 0.001 (0.072) 0.050 (0.070) 
N Lib Dems -0.045 (0.116) -0.106 (0.112) 0.054 (0.105) 
R
2
 0.117 0.038 0.044 
    
e) Difference between respondent defence self-placement and: 
 Conservatives Labour Liberal Democrats 
Partisan composition of conversation network (number of discussants who support party x) 
N Conservatives 0.067 (0.074) 0.173 (0.072)* 0.112 (0.065)+ 
N Labour -0.284 (0.082)** -0.048 (0.080) -0.069 (0.073) 
N Lib Dems -0.127 (0.127) 0.036 (0.124) -0.119 (0.108) 
R
2
 0.081 0.088 0.094 
+ significant at p = 0.10 * significant at p = 0.05 ** significant at p = 0.01 
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Table  A4: Number of partisan discussants and difference between personal and perceived 
party placement on the 2014 ideological dimensions: regression models (standard errors in 
brackets: all models control for age, education, class, partisan ID, strength of party ID and 
attention to politics) 
 
a) Difference between respondent EU integration self-placement and: 
 Conservatives Labour Liberal Democrats 
Partisan composition of conversation network (number of discussants who support party x) 
N Conservatives -0.148 (0.055)** -0.210 (0.055)** -0.289 (0.061)** 
N Labour 0.168 (0.050)** 0.311 (0.050)** 0.287 (0.056)** 
N Lib Dems 0.400 (0.093)** 0.519 (0.093)** 0.445 (0.103)** 
R
2
 0.125 0.152 0.138 
    
b) Difference between respondent redistribution self-placement and: 
 Conservatives Labour Liberal Democrats 
Partisan composition of conversation network (number of discussants who support party x) 
N Conservatives 0.151 (0.042)** 0.395 (0.037)** 0.378 (0.040)** 
N Labour -0.290 (0.037)** -0.086 (0.033)** -0.239 (0.036)** 
N Lib Dems -0.194 (0.072)** -0.042 (0.064) -0.118 (0.068)+ 
R
2
 0.122 0.166 0.175 
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Appendix 2: Codings for the control variables 
 
Partisan identification:  Dummy variables were created for Conservative, Labour, Liberal 
(etc.), and ‘other party’ partisans. The comparison group was individuals who reported no 
partisan loyalties.  
 
Strength of partisanship: Dummy variables were created for very, fairly and not very strong 
partisanship, with no party ID as the control group). 
 
Interest in politics: In 1987 and 1992 this was measured by self-reported interest in politics 
(indexed here by a dummy variable contrasting those who reported caring about the election 
outcome – coded 1 – with those who said they did not care – coded 0). In 2014 the concept 
was measured by the amount of attention respondents felt they generally paid to politics 
(coded from 0 for ‘pay no attention’ to 10 for ‘pay a great deal of attention’);  
 
Highest educational qualification: Educational qualifications were divided into four groups: 
degree-level qualifications; post-school qualifications below degree level; school-level 
qualifications; and no formal qualifications. Dummy variables were constructed for the first 
there, and the last group served as the comparison group.  
Social class:  In 1987 and 1992, class is measured using respondents’ Heath-Goldthorpe 
class, categorised into five groups: the middle class salariat; routine non-manual workers; the 
petit bourgeoisie (small business owners); foremen and supervisors; and manual workers (the 
first four are each given dummy variable, and the last serves as the control group). In 2014, 
the equivalent class variable is available for only part of the sample, so we employ 
individuals’ self-reported class affiliation, which is split into four groups: working class (the 
comparison group); middle class; other class; and no class. 
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